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ARTICLE
FROM INTEGRATIONISM TO EQUAL
PROTECTION: TENBROEK AND THE NEXT
25 YEARS OF DISABILITY RIGHTS
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS*
If there is one person who we can say is most responsible for the legal
theory of the disability rights movement, that person is Jacobus tenBroek.
Professor tenBroek was an influential scholar of disability law, whose writ-
ings in the 1960s laid the groundwork for the disability rights laws we have
today.1  He was also an influential disability rights activist. He was one of
the founders and the president for more than two decades of the National
Federation of the Blind, one of the first—and for many years undisputedly
the most effective—of the organizations made up of people with disabilities
that fought for the rights of people with disabilities.2  Yet in the legal acad-
emy at large, Professor tenBroek is best known not for his disability law
scholarship but for his other work—notably on poverty law (where he was a
key legal architect of the welfare rights movement)3 and especially on the
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This essay is an
annotated version of the 2015–2016 Annual Law Journal Lecture delivered at the University of St.
Thomas Law School in October 2015. Many, many thanks to my hosts at St. Thomas and the
editors of this law journal for all of their assistance.
1. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law
of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1966).
2. See tenBroek, supra note 1, at 841 n.†. For a history of the National Federation of the R
Blind, see generally FLOYD MATSON, WALKING ALONE AND MARCHING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF
THE ORGANIZED BLIND MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1990 (1990).
3. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNC-
TIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 306 n.17 (1971) (“The legal arguments which underpinned litigation
against relief agencies were developed in substantial part by Jacobus tenBroek, a blind professor
of political science at the University of California in Berkeley, who spent the better part of his
career writing about what he called America’s dual system of justice—one for the affluent, an-
other for the poor.”); see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 20–21 (1993). For Professor tenBroek’s most important con-
tributions to poverty law scholarship generally, see FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS BY
JACOBUS TENBROEK (Joel F. Handler ed., 1971).
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Fourteenth Amendment.4
The purpose of this essay is to bring together two of the important
bodies of scholarship produced by Professor tenBroek. Professor ten-
Broek’s disability law work is well known to disability rights activists and
scholars, and his work on the Fourteenth Amendment is well known to con-
stitutional scholars. But nobody has really brought the two lines of work
together. Here, I’d like to do that. In particular, I’d like to show how ten-
Broek’s important scholarship on the antislavery origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment can help us to chart an agenda for the next 25 years of disabil-
ity rights, just as tenBroek’s scholarship on disability integrationism set the
agenda for the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)5 and its first 25
years.
I. INTEGRATIONISM AND THE FIRST 25 YEARS OF THE ADA
In 1966, with President Johnson’s Civil Rights Act having been only
recently adopted, and the battles of the African American civil rights move-
ment still raging, Professor tenBroek published two articles in the Califor-
nia Law Review that sketched out the course of something we did not yet
know to call disability rights law. The articles, entitled “The Disabled and
the Law of Welfare,” and “The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in
the Law of Torts,” defended an integrationist theory of disability law.6  Pro-
fessor tenBroek argued that the American legal response to disability had
previously been marked by “custodialism”—in which the goal was to pro-
tect and maintain people with disabilities as essentially wards of the state.7
But he also argued that in recent years American law had increasingly de-
fended, and should ultimately adopt, a principle of “integrationism”—in
which the goal was to provide people with disabilities the support to enable
them to participate fully in the life of the community.8
One can draw a direct line between tenBroek’s principle of integra-
tionism and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Each of the pieces of leg-
islation that laid the groundwork for the ADA rested on that principle.
Professor tenBroek’s own “Right to Live in the World” piece lauded the
state-by-state adoption of “white cane laws,” which imposed duties on driv-
ers to accommodate blind pedestrians who walked with canes.9  The pur-
pose and effect of those laws, of course, was to guarantee that people with
disabilities could maneuver in society with everyone else, without caretak-
4. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1951); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341 (1949).
5. Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
6. See tenBroek, supra note 1; tenBroek & Matson, supra note 1. R
7. See tenBroek, supra note 1, at 842; tenBroek & Matson, supra note 1, at 816. R
8. See tenBroek, supra note 1, at 843–47; tenBroek & Matson, supra note 1, at 816, 840. R
9. See tenBroek, supra note 1, at 902–11. R
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ers accompanying them every step of the way. These “white cane laws”
really were the first American disability rights statutes.
And they were quickly followed by a wave of federal legislation. The
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968—the first federal disability rights law—
opened up government buildings so that people with disabilities could have
independent access alongside everyone else.10  The Rehabilitation Act of
1973—which applied disability nondiscrimination rules to all federally
funded programs and activities—extended the same integrationist principles
to health care, education, transportation, and the workplace.11  Indeed, the
basic idea behind the Rehabilitation Act’s crucial Section 50412 was to cre-
ate a disability-rights analogue to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,13—the statute that was central in ensuring racial integration of our
Nation’s schools.14
Two years after the Rehabilitation Act, when Congress adopted the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act15 (now the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act), integrationism was at the center of the statute.
The law required schools to serve children with disabilities in the “least
restrictive environment.”16 The statute’s drafters drew that requirement
from earlier constitutional litigation brought by civil rights lawyers who
explicitly sought to apply the principles of Brown v. Board of Education17
to disability.18  “Mainstreaming,” and, later, “inclusion,” became the crucial
buzzwords of the statute.
The final piece of pre-ADA federal disability rights legislation was the
1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act.19  That statute made a number of
changes to strengthen the landmark 1968 Fair Housing Act. One of these
changes was, for the first time, to prohibit housing discrimination based on
disability.20  The Fair Housing Act, like Brown and Title VI, was a center-
piece of the legal efforts to achieve racial integration in the United States.
By adding disability to that statute, Congress again endorsed integrationism
as a basic goal of disability policy.
The Americans with Disabilities Act represents the most comprehen-
sive legal realization of Professor tenBroek’s goal of disability integration.
The ADA, which celebrated its 25th Anniversary last year, fundamentally
10. Act of August 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–480, 82 Stat. 718.
11. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2014).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2014).
14. See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY 41–59 (2d ed. 2001).
15. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773.
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 789, 802–10 (2006) (discussing these developments).
19. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–430, 102 Stat. 1619.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2014).
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promotes integrationism in several ways. Start with the findings that Con-
gress wrote into the statute. The statute says that “historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,” that “such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem,” and that “individuals with disabili-
ties continually encounter various forms of discrimination,” including
“segregation.”21
The focus on integration extends beyond the congressional findings to
the ADA’s core operative provisions as well.  Those provisions interact to
guarantee people with disabilities access to all of the major institutions of
economic and civic life on an equal basis—and require those institutions to
take affirmative steps, in the form of reasonable accommodations, to ensure
that people with disabilities can act as full participants alongside the nondis-
abled. The ADA is premised on the following idea: the major institutions of
society were designed without people with disabilities in mind. But people
with disabilities have a claim in justice to demand that those institutions be
designed with the understanding that they are full members of society like
anyone else and can be expected to participate fully in them—as subjects
with their own projects, choices, and independence, rather than as objects to
be cared for. This basic idea underscores the statute’s prohibitions against
discrimination, its requirements of physical and program accessibility, and
its demand for reasonable accommodations and modifications.22  It is an
idea that Professor tenBroek was the first to develop in legal theory.
The ADA incorporates Professor tenBroek’s policy of integrationism
in a more overt way as well. One of the key cases the Supreme Court has
decided under the statute is its 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring.23  In that case, which has been aptly called the Brown v. Board of
Education of the disability rights movement,24 the Court held that the ADA
imposes an integration mandate, which requires states that administer ser-
vices for people with disabilities to do so in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the individual.25  In the decade and a half since that decision,
Olmstead has pushed states to tilt away from housing people with disabili-
ties in custodial institutions and nursing homes separate from the rest of the
community. Instead, states have begun to build up robust systems of ser-
vices and supports that enable people with disabilities to live in apartments
alongside others in the community; to make basic life choices; and to spend
their lives in the same activities in which everyone else participates. Re-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (5) (2009).
22. For a general discussion, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disabil-
ity,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 418–45 (2000).
23. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
24. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding “We the
People”: The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 49 (2004).
25. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597–603.
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cently, Olmstead has led states to abandon dead-end work in sheltered
workshops and commit to providing supported employment services that
enable people with even very severe disabilities to obtain meaningful, re-
munerative work in the competitive economy.26
Even outside of the Olmstead context, many of the key cases applying
the ADA have guaranteed that people with disabilities get the antidis-
crimination protections and accommodations necessary to participate fully,
equally, and side-by-side with nondisabled persons in all of the key arenas
of everyday life, from attending court and other government proceedings,27
to patronizing stores and businesses,28 to recreational activities like going to
the movies or the ball game,29 patronizing casinos,30 or going on a cruise.31
These developments are a great vindication of tenBroek.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE NEXT 25 YEARS
So the last 25 years, and even before, have been the age of integration
for people with disabilities. I do not want to suggest that the problems of
segregation, isolation, and exclusion that tenBroek highlighted, and that the
ADA attacked, have been solved. Far from it. To be sure, the ADA, and the
legislation that preceded it, has resulted in notable gains for Americans with
disabilities. Buildings and programs are more accessible; Americans with
disabilities are better educated—and far more often educated in integrated
settings—than before; those disabled Americans with jobs by and large
have better jobs; and people with disabilities are far more a part of everyday
American life. But the proportion of Americans with disabilities who are
not in the workforce remains stubbornly high; businesses still fail to comply
with basic requirements of the ADA; services for people with disabilities
are still too often delivered in segregated settings; and prejudice and dis-
crimination persist.
I don’t think it is time to inter Professor tenBroek’s principle of in-
tegrationism. That principle is still vital. But it may be time to build on it
and go beyond it. Many of the issues that occupy the disability rights move-
ment today—and will increasingly occupy the disability rights movement in
the years to come—are not principally about integrationism. Yet I think
Professor tenBroek’s work gives us an important guidepost for thinking
about those issues.
26. For a review of developments since Olmstead, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and
Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012).
27. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008).
29. See, e.g., Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2003); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
30. See, e.g., Joseph R. Perone, Feds Probe A.C. Casinos on Handicapped Access, THE STAR
LEDGER (Mar. 30, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2011/03/post_129.html.
31. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
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The insights come, not from Professor tenBroek’s disability law work,
but from his extremely important scholarship on the Equal Protection
Clause. Lawyers of a certain generation probably spent formative time in
law school working through tenBroek’s 1949 article, written with his col-
league Joseph Tussman, on equal protection law.32  That piece, with its in-
tense and crisp analytical discussion of the problem of legislative
classification—complete with Venn diagrams!—structured how generations
of lawyers, law professors, and judges understood the basic concerns of
equal protection doctrine.  Although I attended law school just over 40
years after Tussman and tenBroek’s article appeared, that article provided
the analytic structure through which I, too, learned equal protection law.
But in some ways tenBroek’s more important theoretical contribution
to equal protection scholarship was his 1951 book, The Antislavery Origins
of the Fourteenth Amendment.33  In that book, Professor tenBroek con-
ducted an extensive old-school originalist examination of where the Four-
teenth Amendment came from and what its drafters understood it to mean.
As the book’s title makes clear, tenBroek found the Amendment’s origins
in the constitutional theories developed by antislavery activists before the
Civil War. These activists included Theodore Weld,34 Henry Stanton,35
Salmon Chase,36 Alvan Stewart,37 and many others. Professor tenBroek
persuasively described how the theories developed and articulated by these
theorists were central to the way that the congressional drafters and support-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment—notably John Bingham—described and
defended that amendment.38
Professor tenBroek argued that a crucial aspect of the antislavery con-
stitutional theory was the concept of the “protection of the laws,” which in
turn formed the root for “equal protection of the laws.”39  This concept was
not about trying to ensure that legislative classifications were reasonable,
rational, or sufficiently closely connected to sufficiently important interests.
Indeed, it wasn’t about legislative classification at all. Rather, it was about
something much more elemental: The right, which the antislavery activists
considered a natural right, to have the government protect individuals
against the depredations of other individuals.40  The antislavery activists de-
rived this natural right from a social-contractarian analysis similar to that of
32. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 4. R
33. TENBROEK, supra note 4. R
34. See id. at 21–23, 27–28.
35. See id. at 27–28.
36. See id. at 37–39.
37. See id. at 43–48.
38. See id. at 183–217.
39. See TENBROEK, supra note 4, at 221–22. R
40. See id. at 20–21, 23, 28–30, 41, 88, 96–98.
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the Declaration of Independence41: Why do people give up their liberty to
submit themselves to the authority of governments?  They do so in order to
achieve protection for their basic interests—life, liberty, and estate in the
Lockean formulation; life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in the Jeffer-
sonian one. “To secure these rights,” the Declaration said, “governments are
instituted among men.”  And because we all give up our liberty in order to
obtain protection of our personal security and other basic interests, the gov-
ernment has an obligation to hold up its end of the deal—to protect us when
other private individuals threaten those interests.42  Equal protection of the
laws was thus an affirmative guarantee of state protection.
tenBroek argued that this, far more than an effort to regulate legislative
classification, is what the Equal Protection Clause was originally intended
to be about. He summarized:
The equal protection of the laws, then, as an integral part of the
doctrines of social compact and natural rights, and as understood
by the abolitionists, was far from the simple command of compar-
ative treatment that courts and later generations have made it.
Freemen, all men, were entitled to have their natural rights pro-
tected by government. Indeed, it was for that purpose and that
purpose only that men entered society and formed governments. *
* *. The equal protection of the laws is thus a command for the
full or ample protection of the laws. It is basically an affirmative
command to supply the protection of the laws. This is its primary
character. Its negative on governmental action is secondary and
almost incidental.43
I am not saying that tenBroek’s is the “right” way to read the Equal
Protection Clause doctrinally; however, I do think that tenBroek’s analysis
brings to the fore some important aspects of constitutionalism in a just soci-
ety that our dominant focus on the “negative Constitution” suppresses.44
And I think that the work of progressive scholars like Robin West, who
have drawn on tenBroek’s argument to develop a constitutional theory in
which the state has important affirmative responsibilities to the people, is
extremely attractive.45  But I don’t have any desire to adjudicate the ques-
tion whether tenBroek is right about the original intent behind, or public
meaning of, the Equal Protection Clause. Some historians have challenged
41. See id. at 62–63 n.20 (discussing the centrality of the Declaration to “the constitutional
theory of the abolitionists”).
42. See id. at 66, 96.
43. Id. at 177.
44. For an aptly-titled critique of the notion of the “negative Constitution,” see Susan
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991).
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tenBroek’s conclusions, while others have offered forceful rebuttals to
those challenges.46
Nor would I say that tenBroek’s abolitionist-derived reading is in any
way the dominant understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in current
doctrine. I mean, obviously—that’s the whole point of the “negative Consti-
tution” phrase. Current doctrine recognizes little in the way of affirmative
constitutional obligations to protect persons against each other.47  To be
sure, there is some hint of tenBroek in Romer v. Evans,48 where the Court
says that “[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”49  And
when a state offers protection to some and not others, the dominant under-
standing even today requires equal protection scrutiny of the differential
treatment. But current doctrine imposes important limitations even there. In
discussing Congress’s power to step in when states fail to provide equal
protection of the laws, tenBroek argues that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives the federal government the authority to step in and pro-
vide the protection that the states are not:
The only possible method by which Congress could by appropri-
ate legislation enforce section 1 would be itself to supply the pro-
tection to individuals which the state had withheld. If individuals
are deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, Congress might supply the due process and see that persons
are not deprived without it. If persons are not protected in their
natural rights at all, or are not as well protected as others, or if
citizens are not protected in their privileges and immunities, then
Congress might make up the state’s deficiency and give the
protection.50
Yet in United States v. Morrison,51 that is exactly what the Court held
that Congress may not do. Although the Court credited evidence indicating
that the judicial systems in many, perhaps most, states did not give female
46. For criticism of tenBroek’s arguments, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-
SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 154–58 (1975). For an avowedly originalist effort to defend
tenBroek’s arguments, see Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Ori-
gins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011).
47. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”); see also Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (“In light of today’s decision and that
in DeShaney, the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a
crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedu-
ral nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”).
48. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
49. Id. at 633.
50. TENBROEK, supra note 4, at 204–05. R
51. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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victims of gender-motivated violence the same protection that they gave
other victims,52 it held that Congress could not respond to the problem by
simply giving the victims the protection the states were withholding—a
cause of action against the individuals who were victimizing them.53
Rather, the Court held, Congress was limited to taking action against the
states themselves54—even though that action would almost certainly be less
efficacious, and it might well create the accountability problems that the
Court has emphasized in its anti-commandeering jurisprudence.55
So I can hardly say that tenBroek’s abolitionist understanding of equal
protection reflects the law today. And it is not my goal to argue that ten-
Broek’s understanding should be the law. Rather, I want to explore what the
abolitionist understanding of equal protection has to tell us about the future
of disability rights in America. As I will argue in the balance of this essay, I
think that many of the issues that are coming to the fore in disability law
and policy are issues that are best addressed by taking that understanding
seriously. If the first 25 years of the ADA were driven by the effort to
codify tenBroek’s integrationist principle, I believe that the next 25 years
will be as much about the effort to heed tenBroek’s equal-protection in-
sights. I will discuss three areas in which the equal-protection issue seems
to me especially salient these days: (1) hate crimes against, and abuse of,
people with disabilities; (2) police use of force against people with disabili-
ties; and (3) the continuing controversy regarding the possible legalization
of physician-assisted suicide.
A. Hate Crimes and Abuse of People with Disabilities
People with disabilities are frequent victims of violent crime. Accord-
ing to data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “The rate of violent victim-
ization against persons with disabilities (36 per 1,000) was more than twice
the age-adjusted rate for persons without disabilities (14 per 1,000) in 2013.
Persons with disabilities experienced 1.3 million violent victimizations, ac-
counting for 21% of all violent victimizations.”56
A number of factors likely contribute to this disparity. A crucial one is
that perpetrators of violent crime specifically target individuals with disabil-
ities, whether out of animus or because of the perception that disabled per-
sons are particularly vulnerable victims. BJS reports that “24% of violent
52. See id. at 619–20.
53. See id. at 625–26.
54. See id.
55. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997). For a tenBroekean criticism of
Morrison, see Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back In the Equal Protection Clause:
Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 429, 449–51 (2004).
56. Erika Harrell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crime Against Persons with Disabilities,
2009–2013—Statistical Tables 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0913st.pdf.
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crime victims with disabilities believed they were targeted due to their
disability.”57
When adults with disabilities receive services in custodial settings such
as state institutions, nursing homes, and group homes, they are especially
vulnerable to violence and abuse. The institutional setting places individu-
als with disabilities in close proximity to caregivers who may not be well
screened and monitored, and the separation of institutions from the commu-
nity limits opportunities for outsiders to see and stop what is going on. In
2011, the journalist Danny Hakim wrote a deeply researched series for the
New York Times on violent abuse in New York’s developmental disability
system. He found that “of some 13,000 allegations of abuse in 2009 within
state-operated and licensed homes, fewer than 5 percent were referred to
law enforcement.”58  Hakim highlighted well-supported allegations of a
number of serious crimes, including aggravated assaults and even rape.59
Children with disabilities are subject to disproportionate abuse and vi-
olence in a variety of settings. A number of studies show that children with
various disabilities are more frequently subject to bullying and harassment
in school.60  The National Crime Victimization survey found that “youth
with any disability are more than two times more likely to be exposed to
sexual assault as other children.”61  And a 2011 review of the literature
found that “children with disabilities (broadly defined) are at significantly
greater risk for physical maltreatment and neglect” by their parents and
caregivers.62  Far too often, this physical maltreatment has the most devas-
tating consequences. The Autistic Self Advocacy Network reports that since
2010, “over seventy people with disabilities have been murdered by their
parents.”63  These parents often claim that they were acting in their chil-
dren’s own interest, to put an end to their “suffering.”64
57. Id. at 5.
58. Danny Hakim, At State-Run Homes, Abuse and Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/nyregion/13homes.html?_r=0.
59. See id.
60. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BULLYING AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (2010),
https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/3d42cb45_b1a4_43ea_829b_306f9e21a393.pdf; Su-
zanne Perkins, An Ecological Perspective on the Comorbidity of Childhood Violence Exposure
and Disabilities: Focus on the Ecology of the School, 2 PSYCHOL. OF VIOLENCE 75, 81 (2012);
Heather A. Turner, Jennifer Vanderminden, David Finkelhor, Sherry Hamby & Anne Shattuck,
Disability and Victimization in a National Sample of Children and Youth, 16 CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT 275, 276 (2011).
61. Turner et al., supra note 60, at 276. R
62. Id.
63. Diane Coleman, NDY Joins Autistic Self Advocacy Network, ADAPT and NCIL in Annual
Day of Mourning, NOT DEAD YET (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.notdeadyet.org/2015/01/ndy-joins-
autistic-self-advocacy-network-adapt-and-ncil-in-annual-day-of-mourning.html (quoting Autistic
Self Advocacy Network’s statement).
64. See, e.g., Rohini Coorg & Anne Tournay, Filicide-Suicide Involving Children With Disa-
bilities, 28 J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 745, 745 (2012).
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These statistics obviously describe a major threat to the equality of
people with disabilities. They also, I would argue, describe a problem of
equal protection of the laws. Where matters of such basic personal security
as the freedom from abuse, violence, rape, and murder are concerned, we
are at the core of the matters with which, according to Professor tenBroek,
the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned. Heeding the abolitionist under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state has an obligation to pro-
tect individuals with disabilities against these bodily invasions. And it has
an obligation to provide equal protection to individuals with disabilities—
which is to say, no less protection than the state provides to nondisabled
victims of similar violence.
But the state has failed in this obligation. In particular, the legal system
has generally not taken violent crime and abuse against individuals with
disabilities as seriously as it has taken similar types of violence against
nondisabled individuals. To be sure, there are encouraging signs. The Shep-
ard-Byrd Hate Crimes Act, signed by President Obama in 2009, provides
federal criminal penalties for discriminatory violence against individuals
with disabilities.65  The first ever prosecution under that law involved a
shocking act of violence perpetrated against a Native American young man
with a developmental disability. A Justice Department press release sum-
marized the facts this way:
Beebe took the victim to his apartment, which was adorned in
racist paraphernalia, including a Nazi flag and a woven dream
catcher with a swastika in it. After the victim had fallen asleep,
the defendants began defacing the victim’s body by drawing on
him with blue, red and black markers. Once the victim awoke,
Beebe branded the victim, who sat with a towel in his mouth, by
heating a wire hanger on a stove and burning the victim’s flesh,
causing a permanent deep impression of a swastika in his skin.
The defendants used a cell phone to create a recording of the vic-
tim in which they coerced him to agree to be branded.66
The enactment of the Shepard-Byrd Act, and prosecutions like that
one, are important steps in guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws.
But they are not enough. Ample evidence demonstrates that police, prose-
cutors, and jurors frequently disbelieve reports of violence when they are
made by individuals with disabilities.67  And this disbelief, in turn, encour-
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2006).
66. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Two Men Sentenced for Racially-
Motivated Assault in New Mexico (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-sen
tenced-racially-motivated-assault-new-mexico.
67. See, e.g., Bernadette West & Sampada Gandhi, Reporting Abuse: A Study of the Percep-
tions of People with Disabilities (PWD) Regarding Abuse Directed at PWD, DISABILITY STUD. Q.,
Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006) (collecting evidence); Laurie E. Powers & Mary Oschwald, Violence and
Abuse Against People with Disabilities: Experiences, Barriers, and Prevention Strategies 8
(2004), http://www.phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/files/clearinghouse/AbuseandViolence
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ages victimizers to select disabled individuals as their targets.68  So does the
failure of law enforcement to penetrate the closed, out-of-the-way, segre-
gated settings in which too many people with significant disabilities are
forced to spend significant portions of their lives.69
In the case of parents who kill their children who have disabilities, the
denial of equal protection is rooted in deep societal attitudes of what Paul
Brest in another context calls “selective sympathy and indifference.”70
Many nondisabled persons instinctively sympathize with the parents in
these situations, without taking the perspective of the disabled children seri-
ously. And these societal attitudes affect prosecution, conviction, and sen-
tencing decisions. As the Autistic Self Advocacy Network describes it,
“[t]he media portrays these murders as justifiable and inevitable due to the
‘burden’ of having a disabled person in the family. If the parent stands trial,
they are given sympathy and comparatively lighter sentences, if they are
sentenced at all.”71
When parents of individuals with disabilities struggle because of a lack
of adequate services for their loved ones, we should of course sympathize
and work to ensure that their loved ones get the services and support they
need. There is no doubt that our current disability system relies too heavily
on parents and family members to provide the supports needed to live in the
community.72  That is a problem because of the burden it places on fami-
lies, but it is also a problem because it denies independence to individuals
with disabilities. Individuals without disabilities, as they grow up into adult-
hood, want to move away from their parents and begin a life on their own,
in which they control what they do on a day-to-day and minute-to-minute
basis. Individuals with disabilities often want the same thing. When our
service system forces parents to serve in the role of front-line caregivers for
Brief%203-7-04.pdf, (“Men and women with disabilities have described common and unique per-
sonal barriers to managing abuse. While most individuals are concerned that they won’t be be-
lieved if they report abuse, men with disabilities and people with cognitive disabilities express
particular concern.”); Elizabeth Reiman, Implicit Bias about Disabilities: Does it Exist for Foren-
sic Interviewers and Could It Affect Child Credibility Decisions in Child Abuse Investigations: An
Exploratory Study (Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York),
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=gc_etds (finding im-
plicit bias against disability among forensic interviewers).
68. See Shunit Reiter, Diane N. Bryen & Ifat Shachar, Adolescents with Intellectual Disabili-
ties as Victims of Abuse, 11 J. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 371, 372 (2007) (“Offenders are drawn
to victims with disabilities because they are considered to be vulnerable and unable to seek help or
report the crime.”).
69. See, e.g., Leonora LaPeter Anton, Michael Braga & Anthony Cormier, Shrouded in Se-
crecy: How Florida’s Mental Hospitals Keep Deadly Mistakes Hidden, TAMPA BAY TIMES/HER-
ALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 2, 2015, http://www.tampabay.com/projects/2015/investigations/florida-
mental-health-hospitals/secrecy/.
70. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976).
71. Coleman, supra note 63 (quoting ASAN). R
72. See Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 44. R
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their adult children with disabilities, it denies individuals with disabilities
the opportunity for independence that nondisabled adults take for granted.
That is wrong, and we need to change our long-term support policies to
resolve the problem.
But that is a far cry from excusing or justifying the killings of individ-
uals with disabilities by their parents. To punish those parents less severely
than other parents who commit filicide is to value the lives of people with
disabilities less than those of the nondisabled. That form of disparate regard
denies equal protection of the laws in Professor tenBroek’s sense.
These acts of violence implicate the basic security—and even the life-
and-death interests—of individuals with disabilities. Disability rights advo-
cacy must urgently focus on providing the equal protection of the laws that
is necessary to prevent and punish them.
B. Police Use of Force Against People with Disabilities
The Black Lives Matter movement has recently focused much-needed
attention on unnecessary and undue police use of force against African
Americans. What is often lost in the discussion is that many of the victims
of unnecessary use of force—including many of its African American vic-
tims—are individuals with disabilities whose disabilities play an important
role in leading to the use of violence against them.73
The most common scenario involves individuals with mental illness.
Indeed, a recent review of the literature by the ACLU concluded that ap-
proximately “half of fatal police encounters involve persons with psychiat-
ric disabilities.”74  That’s half of all fatal police encounters, not just half of
the fatal police encounters involving individuals with disabilities. A com-
prehensive review of case reports by the Washington Post this past summer
found a smaller fraction, but still a strikingly large number. In the first six
months of 2015, the Post found, police in the United States had shot and
killed 462 people, 124 of whom (over one quarter) were, in the Post’s
words, “in the throes of mental or emotional crisis.”75 Because the newspa-
per’s analysis focused only on police shootings of those who expressed sui-
73. See, e.g., Rick Cohen, Excessive Police Force toward Persons with Disabilities Needs
National Discussion, NON PROFIT Q., May 26, 2015, http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/05/26/ex
cessive-police-force-toward-persons-with-disabilities-needs-national-discussion/ (“Recent cases of
alleged police brutality toward blacks intersect with the presence of disabilities in some striking
ways. Ruderman and Simons note, for example, that Freddie Gray may have had an intellectual
disability due to the effects of lead poisoning. In Boston, there was the case of 41-year-old Wil-
fredo Justiniano, suffering from schizophrenia, who despite being ‘armed’ only with a writing pen
was killed in 2013 by a police officer.”).
74. Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17, City and County
of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 01-1015), 2015 WL 721233.
75. Wesley Lowery, Kimberly Kindy, Keith L. Alexander, Julie Tate, Jennifer Jenkins
& Steven Rich, Distraught People, Deadly Results, WASH. POST, June 30, 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/06/30/distraught-people-deadly-results/.
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cidal intentions or for whom “police or family members confirmed a history
of mental illness,” it acknowledged that its “approach likely understates the
scope of the problem.”76
Even so, the Post’s findings were striking. Thirty percent of individu-
als in mental health crisis who were shot by the police “carried a blade,
such as a knife or a machete—weapons that rarely prove deadly to police
officers.”77  Perhaps most strikingly, in 45 of the 124 cases, the reason the
police were called in the first place was to help the individual obtain mental
health treatment. But rather than provide the protection for which they were
called in, they ended up fatally shooting those they were initially supposed
to be helping.78
Is this because police are bad people?  Not at all. Does it mean that the
police are intentionally discriminating against individuals with mental ill-
ness?  Not necessarily. But it does reflect a denial by the state of the equal
protection of the laws. There is nothing inevitable about police officers
serving as the front-line responders to mental health crises. Rather, the cen-
tral role of law enforcement results from the state’s choices about how to
set up its service delivery system.
The most effective responses to mental health crises do not involve
law enforcement in the first instance, but instead involve trained mental
health professionals—social workers, psychologists, even psychiatrists—as
well as peers who are trained to de-escalate and intervene appropriately.79
It is notable—and should be a model—that the Department of Justice in its
ADA settlements over the past five years has treated mental health crisis
services as a key component of a state’s compliance with the Olmstead
decision. Those settlements have required states to implement a number of
types of crisis services, including 24-hour crisis hotlines, mobile crisis
teams staffed by mental health professionals, and crisis drop-in centers,
beds, and apartments staffed by peers for times when people briefly need
residential services.80  These requirements create an integrated mental
health crisis system that focuses on ensuring that those who go into crisis
can retain their ties to the community to the extent possible—and that, cru-
cially, does not make the police the primary entry-point into the mental
health system.
Adoption of reforms like these would significantly reduce the occasion
for risky encounters between law-enforcement officers and individuals with




79. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES ADMIN., PRACTICE GUIDELINES: CORE ELEMENTS IN RESPONDING TO MENTAL HEALTH
CRISIS 7, 9 (2009), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA09-4427/SMA09-4427.pdf.
80. For discussion of some of these settlements, see Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 35–36. R
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counters entirely. But that points to another failure of our current practices.
Despite the successful efforts of some forward-looking police departments
around the country, officers by and large still do not receive appropriate or
sufficient training for dealing with individuals who are experiencing mental
health crises. The Washington Post reported that “[a]lthough new recruits
typically spend nearly 60 hours learning to handle a gun, . . . they receive
only eight hours of training to de-escalate tense situations and eight hours
learning strategies for handling the mentally ill.”81  Even when they do re-
ceive training in how to address these situations, the Post reported, that
training tends to be “counterproductive,” by encouraging officers to estab-
lish authority and control as a first principle—an approach that will typi-
cally escalate rather than de-escalate a mental health crisis.82  But
accumulating evidence demonstrates that, even when police remain the first
responders to mental health crisis, the use of specially-trained “crisis inter-
vention teams” can lead to much better outcomes.83
It is thus fair to say that many of the police shootings that have in-
spired such vocal opposition recently are the direct result of the state’s fail-
ure to provide appropriate mental health crisis services and to give
sufficient training to police officers in addressing mental health crises. To a
lesser extent, individuals with other sorts of disabilities—including deaf-
ness, cerebral palsy, autism, and intellectual disabilities—confront similar
problems. The lack of police training to deal with people with these disabil-
ities has led to inappropriate arrest, excessive use of force, and even
death.84  Equal protection demands that police receive the training neces-
sary to engage appropriately and safely with individuals with disabilities.
Last term, in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,85 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the ADA applies to police
uses of force against people with disabilities. The Court ultimately avoided
the question,86 but its opinion suggests that many justices seriously enter-
tained the proposition that the ADA does not apply to such uses of force—
and that a majority of the Court might well endorse that proposition in an
appropriate case in the future.87  Such a position, it seems to me, would
81. Lowery et al., supra note 75. R
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Amy C. Watson & Anjali J. Fulambarker, The Crisis Intervention Team Model
of Police Response to Mental Health Crises: A Primer for Mental Health Practitioners, 8 BEST
PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH 71 (2012).
84. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Sheehan, supra
note 74, at 9–16.
85. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
86. See id. at 1773–74.
87. See id. (citation omitted):
Our decision not to decide whether the ADA applies to arrests is reinforced by the
parties’ failure to address a related question: whether a public entity can be liable for
damages under Title II for an arrest made by its police officers. Only public entities are
subject to Title II, and the parties agree that such an entity can be held vicariously liable
for money damages for the purposeful or deliberately indifferent conduct of its employ-
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\13-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 16 15-MAR-17 14:32
28 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1
disregard the plain text of the ADA, which covers anything a state and local
government does, without any textual limitation.88  It would also disregard
the Court’s own unanimous decision in the 1998 Yeskey case, which held
that the statute’s general language unambiguously applies to the operations
of state prisons and which refused to read any unexpressed exception into
the broad statutory text.89  But even more than that, a decision to exempt
police uses of force from the ADA’s coverage would represent an abdica-
tion of the tenBroekian obligation to guarantee the equal protection of the
laws. I am therefore somewhat relieved that the Court avoided the issue,
though I find the suggestions in the Court’s opinion worrisome.
Now, you may see a tension between my first example and this one.
Earlier, I was arguing that the failure to provide aggressive policing and
prosecution denied equal protection of the laws to individuals with disabili-
ties. Here, you might say, I’m arguing that too aggressive policing denies
equal protection. Can these two positions coexist?
I would argue yes—and that the two positions have coexisted since the
development of the abolitionist constitutionalism that Professor tenBroek
elaborates in his work. Abolitionist constitutionalists argued that the brutal-
ity of the state and the failure of the state to intervene to stop the brutality
of private parties were two sides of the same coin.90  The theme appears in
the work of Professor tenBroek’s contemporary, Gunnar Myrdal, whose An
American Dilemma treats police brutality and the lack of effective policing
in black communities as components of the same problem.91  And it is a
central theme in President Truman’s groundbreaking civil rights report, To
Secure These Rights, issued in 194792—which was the basis for the civil
rights plank that Minneapolis’s then-mayor Hubert Humphrey memorably
supported during the Democratic National Convention the following year.93
I argue that we should apply the same insights to the disability context.
ees. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–12, 22. But we have never decided whether that is correct,
and we decline to do so here, in the absence of adversarial briefing.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
89. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).
90. See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 4, at 88 (quoting abolitionist lawyer Joel Tiffany’s argu- R
ment that citizens have a right to demand “protection against the oppression of individuals, com-
munities and nations, foreign nations and domestic states; against lawless violence exercised
under the forms of governmental authority”); id. at 97 (“The equal protection of the laws is vio-
lated fully as much, perhaps even more, by private invasions made possible through failure of
government to act as by discriminatory laws and officials.”).
91. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 535–46 (1944).
92. See PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 20–27 (1947).
93. See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE & THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THESE UNITED STATES: A NA-
TION IN THE MAKING, 1890 TO THE PRESENT 312 (2015).
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C. Assisted Suicide
Let me turn to my third example. Unlike the others, it is not strictly a
criminal justice issue, but it is very much in the news: the legalization of
assisted suicide. In its 1997 decisions Washington v. Glucksberg94 and
Vacco v. Quill,95 the Supreme Court upheld state laws in Washington State
and New York banning physician-assisted suicide. Although the large num-
ber of separate opinions made the Court’s precise rationale unclear—and
subject to continuing dispute96—the Court plainly held, at least in the cir-
cumstances of the cases before it, that the Washington and New York stat-
utes did not deny Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process97 and equal
protection.98
Disability issues were central to the litigation and decision of Gluck-
sberg and Quill. When the New York Task Force on Life and the Law
recommended, in 1994, that the state retain its prohibition on assisted sui-
cide, it highlighted two key risks that legalization would pose to people
with disabilities. First, it noted that many people who commit suicide are
depressed or have other psychiatric conditions, yet these conditions are
poorly diagnosed and treated; many others, it noted, have chronic pain but
do not have access to appropriate pain treatment.99  Allowing assisted sui-
cide, the Task Force concluded, thus would predictably lead to the unneces-
sary deaths of people with these conditions.100  Second, the Task Force
concluded that people whose disabilities are costly to treat would face sub-
tle coercion—from insurers, doctors, family members, or even their own
sense of obligation to family members—to end their lives.101  When the
Clinton Administration filed a brief in support of the prohibition of assisted
suicide, it highlighted these disability issues.102
So did the Court in its Glucksberg opinion. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s Opinion for the Court in Glucksberg makes an argument that
sounds rather clearly in Professor tenBroek’s equal protection theory
(though he does not cite tenBroek):
94. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
95. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997 (“On June 26, the Court decided these cases, refusing to recognize such a
right by an apparently crushing 9-0 vote. But though press reports did not make this clear, the
unanimity of the vote was deceptive. Five of the six justices who wrote opinions made it plain that
they did not reject such a right in principle, suggesting that the Court might well change its mind
in a future case when more evidence of the practical impact of any such right was available.”).
97. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
98. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 797.
99. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUI-
CIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19–24, Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185.
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The State’s interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from
coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill people from
prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and “societal indifference.”
The State’s assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the
lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued
than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled per-
son’s suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as
anyone else’s.103
Since Glucksberg and Quill, advocates of the legalization of assisted
suicide have proceeded on a state-by-state basis. They have obtained pas-
sage of laws in Oregon,104 Vermont,105 and Washington106 that have legal-
ized and regulated the practice, and they have won a major step toward
legalization in the Montana state courts.107  New developments on the issue
occur almost daily. The New Mexico Supreme Court seems poised to legal-
ize assisted suicide in that state.108  And just hours before I gave the lecture
that formed the basis for this essay, California Governor Jerry Brown
signed a bill to legalize assisted suicide in the Golden State.109
Much of the public debate surrounding these developments has taken a
form that is familiar from the politics of abortion rights. Defenders of the
legalization of assisted suicide argue in terms of individual liberty, the right
to make choices that are fundamental to directing one’s own life course and
authoring one’s own life story, and the right to control one’s body.110  Most
of the opponents whose voices are heard in the media argue that assisted
suicide denies the sanctity of human life.111  Not surprisingly, the media
tends to portray fights over the assisted suicide issue as but another battle in
the abortion wars.
There is a degree to which this portrayal is accurate. Many supporters
of the legalization of assisted suicide do see their position as congruent
with, and perhaps even required by, their support for the right of a woman
103. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
104. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800–127.897.
105. See 18 Vt. Stat. Ann. Ch. 113.
106. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.245.010–904.
107. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
108. See Madeline Schmitt, New Mexico Supreme Court Hears Assisted Suicide Case, KRQE
NEWS 13 (Oct. 26, 2015), http://krqe.com/2015/10/26/new-mexico-supreme-court-hears-assisted-
suicide-case/.
109. See Patrick McGreevy, After Struggling, Jerry Brown Makes Assisted Suicide Legal In
California, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-brown-
end-of-life-bill-20151005-story.html.
110. See, e.g., Kevin Drum, My Right to Die: Assisted Suicide, My Family, and Me, MOTHER
JONES, Jan./Feb. 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/01/assisted-suicide-legalization
-california-kevin-drum.
111. See, e.g., Damon Linker, Why Opposition to Assisted Suicide is Inextricably Tied to Re-
ligion, THE WEEK, Jan. 20, 2016, http://theweek.com/articles/600032/why-opposition-assisted-sui
cide-inextricably-tied-religion.
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to choose to have an abortion.112  And many opponents oppose the legaliza-
tion of assisted suicide based on a vitalist view that accords with their anti-
abortion politics.113
But Professor tenBroek’s analysis points the way to a different argu-
ment against the legalization of assisted suicide, one that scrambles the
traditional lines of abortion politics. It is an argument that many disability
rights activists who are avowedly pro-choice have repeatedly made, though
it is one that has struggled to be heard in the media narrative.114
The basic argument is this115: In our society, when people seek to ter-
minate their own lives, the dominant societal response is to try to stop them
from doing so. We have suicide hotlines, we place people under suicide
watch in jails and hospitals, and we may even civilly commit people or
otherwise severely restrict their liberty to prevent them from killing them-
selves. But when a person has a disability, advocates of assisted suicide
believe that the desire to kill oneself is understandable. They thus argue for
withdrawing the protection of the state laws that generally prohibit third
parties from aiding people in ending their own lives. This reflects a nega-
tive—and stereotypical or prejudiced—view of life with a disability, one
that most people with disabilities do not hold.116  And it also constitutes a
denial of equal protection of the laws in Professor tenBroek’s sense—as the
Court’s opinion in Glucksberg all but told us.
I would argue, therefore, that if one takes Professor tenBroek’s under-
standing of equal protection seriously, one should oppose the legalization of
assisted suicide. And that is true whether one holds to a general anti-abor-
tion politics or one instead supports abortion rights.117
112. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls & Judith Jarvis
Thomson, et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997.
113. This is true even of some disability rights advocates who oppose assisted suicide. See,
e.g., Stephen L. Mikochik, Assisted Suicide and Disabled People, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 987 (1997).
114. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Article on Roe,
Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803 (1995); Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of
Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities—Is it a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. &
MED. 47, 59–60 (1993); Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide Cases, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21–22.
115. I cite numerous disability rights advocates making aspects of this argument in Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 425, 435 (2006).
116. On the differences in attitudes toward disability between those with and those without
disabilities, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383 (2012); Sa-
muel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability,
60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007).
117. I once thought that one’s views on the prohibition of assisted suicide necessarily had to
track one’s views on the prohibition of disability-selective abortion—that is, if one thought that
assisted suicide should be banned, one should also think that disability-selective abortion should
be banned as well. See Bagenstos, supra note 115, at 461. That may be true if one’s basis for R
prohibiting assisted suicide is simply a concern about coercion. But to the extent that the concern
about assisted suicide is the failure to provide equal protection to persons with disabilities, as I
argue here it should be, then one’s view about disability-selective abortion should turn in signifi-
cant part on one’s views of fetal personhood. Whether the fetus has personhood status has, of
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\13-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 20 15-MAR-17 14:32
32 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1
III. CONCLUSION
Professor tenBroek’s principle of integrationism set the agenda for the
first 25 years of the ADA, and it’s still a vital principle. But the life-and-
death issues that I have discussed today are exceptionally important right
now, and those issues are best addressed by a different principle, one also
developed by Professor tenBroek—the abolitionist understanding of the
equal protection of the laws. That principle should set our agenda for the
next 25 years.
course, been a central focus of debate over abortion rights generally. See generally Maya Manian,
Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (2013). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–59 (1973), the Supreme Court
reviewed constitutional text, history, and precedent and concluded that “the word ‘person,’ as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” Thus, I think one can oppose assisted
suicide on tenBroekian equal protection grounds regardless of one’s views of any particular abor-
tion regulation.
